Not clawing the hand that feeds you: The case of co-opted boards and clawbacks by HUANG, Sterling et al.
Singapore Management University
Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University
Research Collection School Of Accountancy School of Accountancy
1-2019
Not clawing the hand that feeds you: The case of
co-opted boards and clawbacks
Sterling HUANG
Singapore Management University, SHUANG@smu.edu.sg
Chee Yeow LIM
Singapore Management University, cheeyeowlim@smu.edu.sg
Jeffrey NG
Singapore Management University, jeffreyng@smu.edu.sg
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1080/09638180.2018.1446036
Follow this and additional works at: https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/soa_research
Part of the Accounting Commons, and the Corporate Finance Commons
This Journal Article is brought to you for free and open access by the School of Accountancy at Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management
University. It has been accepted for inclusion in Research Collection School Of Accountancy by an authorized administrator of Institutional
Knowledge at Singapore Management University. For more information, please email libIR@smu.edu.sg.
Citation
HUANG, Sterling; LIM, Chee Yeow; and NG, Jeffrey. Not clawing the hand that feeds you: The case of co-opted boards and
clawbacks. (2019). European Accounting Review. 28, (1), 101-127. Research Collection School Of Accountancy.
Available at: https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/soa_research/1423
  
   
 
 
Not Clawing the Hand that Feeds You:  









Singapore Management University 
 
Chee Yeow Lim 
cheeyeowlim@smu.edu.sg  












We examine how board co-option, defined as the fraction of the board comprising directors 
appointed after the CEO assumed office, is related to clawback adoption. We find that co-opted 
boards have a lower probability of adopting clawback provisions. Further, the negative 
association between board co-option and clawback adoption is more pronounced when at least 
one co-opted member is on the compensation committee and when there is a higher likelihood 
that a clawback provision will be triggered. Finally, we find that board co-option is an 
important mechanism through which longer-tenured CEOs reduce the likelihood of clawback 
adoption.  
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Clawback provisions have become increasingly prevalent in recent years, with the aim  
to provide a punishment mechanism that more closely links an executive’s compensation to 
his/her financial reporting behavior. Clawbacks typically allow firms to recoup compensation 
from executives in the event of an accounting restatement. Despite evidence that clawbacks 
affect important firm outcomes such as earnings management and contracting (e.g., Chan, 
Chen, Chen, and Yu, 2012, 2014; Chan, Chen, and Chen, 2013; Dehaan, Hodge, and Shevlin, 
2013; Iskandar-Datta and Jia, 2013), their efficacy has been questioned because the provisions 
are rarely enforced (Fried and Shilon, 2011; Babenko, Bennett, Bizjak, and Coles, 2015). 
Instead of examining the outcomes of clawbacks, some studies focus on how various corporate 
governance mechanisms are associated with clawback adoption (e.g., Addy, Chu, and Yoder, 
2014; Babenko et al., 2015). In this paper, we extend the literature by examining how a specific 
governance attribute, board co-option, affects the likelihood of a board adopting a clawback.  
Board co-option is a relatively new construct in the corporate governance literature; it 
refers to how beholden directors are to the CEO. Coles, Daniel, and Naveen (2014) find that as 
board co-option increases, board monitoring weakens: turnover-performance sensitivity 
decreases, non-performance-related pay increases, and investment increases.1 These effects are 
incremental to CEO tenure and other board characteristics such as board independence. 
Following Coles et al. (2014), we define a co-opted board as the fraction of the board made up 
of directors appointed after the CEO assumed office.  
Our focus on co-opted boards is motivated by the fact that in practice, CEOs (and other 
top executives) are likely to exert considerable influence on the selection of board members 
(Coles et al., 2014). Related to the concept of co-opted boards is that of friendly boards (Adams 
                                                 
1 While Coles et al. (2014) provide no direct evidence of whether an increase in investment due to board co-option 
enhances or destroys shareholder value, based on related work by Pan, Wang and Weisbach (2013) they suggest 
that such increased investment reflects overinvestment that harms shareholders. 
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and Ferreira, 2007). A distinction between co-opted boards and friendly boards, however, is 
that the former are not only likely to be friendly toward the CEO, but they are also likely to be 
more beholden to him/her, at least for the appointment to the board. The latter aspect makes 
the issue of “biting the hand that feeds you” more salient. In matters of compensation, directors 
often have financial, social, and psychological reasons for favoring executives (Fried and 
Shilon, 2011). To the extent that directors feel loyal to an executive or otherwise care about 
their relationship with that person, the decision to adopt a policy to recover excess pay from 
that executive is likely to have a personal cost (Bebchuk and Fried, 2005; Fried and Shilon, 
2011). 2  As the extent of co-option increases, a greater proportion of directors may take 
relational factors into account when deciding whether to adopt a clawback provision, 
suggesting that a board’s decision to adopt clawbacks is negatively associated with board co-
option after controlling for CEO characteristics (e.g., CEO tenure), board characteristics (e.g., 
board independence) and other firm characteristics (e.g., profitability).3  
However, prior studies also indicate that directors suffer from reputational damage in 
the labor market when they are implicated in financial misconduct (Fich and Shivdasani, 2007; 
Srinivasan, 2005; Ertimur, Ferri, and Maber, 2012; Brochet and Srinivsan, 2014). This concern 
about reputation value in the director labor market might fully mitigate the directors’ tendency 
to be beholden to the CEO, suggesting no association between clawback adoption and co-
option. In the extreme, directors may even advocate for clawback adoption to demonstrate their 
commitment to board independence, which suggests a positive relation between clawback 
                                                 
2 Even if there is a very low likelihood of enforcing clawbacks in the future, the adoption of a mechanism that has 
a non-zero probability of being detrimental to the future welfare of one’s benefactor/friend could be perceived as 
“unfriendly.”  
3 It is important to control for these characteristics to demonstrate the incremental effect of board co-option 
because studies have documented that such characteristics are associated with clawbacks (e.g., Brown, Davis-
Friday and Guler, 2011; Babenko et al., 2015; DeHaan et al., 2013; Addy et al., 2014; Chan et al., 2014). For 
example, Addy et al. (2014) show that greater management entrenchment is associated with a lower likelihood of 
clawbacks, while board interlocks with other companies with clawbacks are associated with a higher likelihood. 
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adoption and co-option. Hence, the relation between board co-option and clawbacks is 
ultimately an empirical question. 
 To examine the relation between board dynamics and clawbacks, we obtain information 
on board characteristics from Riskmetrics and information on clawbacks from GMI 
International. By merging these two sets of information and only focusing on firms that adopt 
clawback provisions during our sample period, we obtain a sample of 2,900 firm-years over 
the 2007-2013 period. Using this sample, we examine whether co-opted boards have an 
incremental effect on clawback adoption after including controls for CEO, board, and other 
firm characteristics as well as year and firm fixed effects. Although the inclusion of firm fixed 
effects eliminates all firm-year observations where there are no changes in clawback status,4 it 
also controls for any time-invariant firm-level omitted variables. In all of the empirical designs, 
we find robust evidence that co-opted boards are negatively associated with clawback adoption. 
Next, we run two sets of cross-sectional analyses to enrich our examination of how the 
board’s beholdenness to the CEO affects clawbacks and to provide some supporting 
identification of the causal effect.5 First, we rely on the natural assumption that co-opted board 
directors are more likely to influence the adoption of a clawback policy if they are on the 
compensation committee because a clawback policy is essentially a component of a firm’s 
entire remuneration policy (Conyon and Peck, 1998; Dehaan et al., 2013; Babenko et al., 2015). 
Consistent with our expectations, we find that the negative association between board co-option 
and clawback adoption is more pronounced when at least one co-opted member is present on 
the compensation committee. Second, we examine how the likelihood of triggering a clawback 
provision moderates the effect of board co-option on clawback adoption. We conjecture that 
co-opted boards are less likely to adopt clawbacks if there is a higher likelihood that the 
                                                 
4 During our sample period, no firms drop their clawback provisions. 
5 In addition to providing a richer analysis of the relation between board co-option and clawbacks, these cross-
sectional analyses help to mitigate endogeneity concerns. 
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clawback provision will be triggered. Using prior restatements to proxy this likelihood, we find 
evidence that co-opted boards are less likely to adopt clawbacks if there is a higher likelihood 
that the provision will be triggered. In a supplementary analysis, we examine how board co-
option is an underlying mechanism through which CEOs can exert their power to reduce the 
likelihood of clawback adoption. Using CEO tenure as a proxy for CEO power, we find 
significant evidence that CEO power is associated with higher board co-option, which is in turn 
associated with a reduced likelihood of clawbacks. The Sobel (1982) test provides further 
evidence of the statistical significance of board co-option as a mediating mechanism linking 
CEO power and clawback adoption.  
We contribute to the literature that examines the consequences of having a board that 
is positively predisposed toward the CEO (e.g., Adams and Ferreira, 2007; Fracassi and Tate, 
2012; Hwang and Kim, 2009; Coles et al., 2014).6 We focus on board co-option as an important 
yet understudied dimension of board dynamics. Board co-option is an important dimension 
because of the concern that the CEO’s involvement in the selection of the board directors could 
lead to beholdenness, which in turn weakens board monitoring and the CEO’s (and other top 
executives’) discipline. Unlike Coles et al. (2014), who focus on the implementation of ex post 
discipline by co-opted boards, we focus on the adoption of ex ante monitoring mechanisms, 
specifically clawbacks, to constrain bad behavior. To the best of our knowledge, our paper is 
the first to examine how the board’s beholdenness to the CEO can affect its implementation of 
policies that specifically target financial misreporting.7 Because clawbacks primarily relate to 
                                                 
6 For example, Fracassi and Tate (2012) show that CEO–director connections weaken board monitoring and 
destroy corporate value. Hwang and Kim (2009) find that firms with board members who are personally connected 
to the CEO have higher CEO compensation, lower pay-performance sensitivity, and lower turnover-performance 
sensitivity. 
7 Research in political science and finance also suggests that one reason policies are not implemented is because 
the policy makers do not want to “bite the hand that feeds them.” For example, voting on antismoking legislation 
is associated with tobacco industry lobbying and campaign contributions (Givel and Glantz, 2001; Glantz and 
Begay, 1994; Monardi and Glantz, 1998). Ovtchinnikov and Pantaleoni (2012) report that Microsoft’s political 
contributions increased significantly during the firm’s antitrust litigation with the Department of Justice, with the 
latter finally announcing that it would not order the breakup of the company. 
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accounting restatements, they provide a unique opportunity to examine more closely how 
boards can actually perform their fiduciary duties in establishing policies to ensure that 
management complies with disclosure regulations. We find that after controlling for other 
governance attributes, co-opted boards are less likely to adopt clawbacks. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents some 
background on clawbacks and our hypotheses. Section 3 covers the empirical analyses on board 
dynamics and clawbacks. Section 4 details our conclusions. 
 
2. Background and Hypothesis Development 
2.1. Literature Review 
Since the early 2000s, firms have increasingly and voluntarily adopted clawbacks, 
particularly those triggered by material accounting restatements (Dehaan et al., 2013). This 
trend is probably driven by the financial reporting failures of the late 1990s and early 2000s as 
well as by increasing concern over how incentive compensation encourages accounting 
manipulation to increase executive pay. Recent studies examining the economic consequences 
of clawbacks typically focus on the fact that the adoption of clawbacks could have a positive 
impact on financial reporting ex ante by punishing executives for financial misreporting ex 
post. This positive impact could in turn be associated with various positive economic 
consequences, such as better loan terms and higher firm valuation.  
Chan et al. (2012) demonstrate that the incidence of accounting restatements declines 
after firms initiate such provisions. In addition, they show that investors and auditors view such 
provisions as being associated with increased accounting quality and lower audit risk. 
Similarly, Dehaan et al. (2013) find that clawback provisions improve financial reporting 
quality. Chan et al. (2014) document that clawback initiation leads firms to replace accounting-
based earnings manipulation with real activity management. Chan et al. (2013) examine the 
effect of clawbacks on bank loan contracting and document that banks use more financial 
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covenants and performance pricing provisions in loan contracts and decrease interest rates after 
firms initiate clawbacks. Moreover, they find that loan maturity increases and loan collateral 
decreases in the wake of a clawback. Iskandar-Datta and Jia (2013) find that the shareholders 
of firms with clawback provisions are associated with higher stock valuations. 
Some scholars question whether the benefits of clawback adoption that the accounting 
literature documents are simply artifacts of self-selection. That is, certain types of firms choose 
to adopt clawbacks, as opposed to clawbacks actually constraining the bad behavior that they 
target (Denis, 2012). For example, Fried and Shilon (2011) document that the overwhelming 
majority of clawback policies give directors complete discretion to forego a clawback of excess 
pay, even if the directors determine that the executive committed misconduct. Most of the 
remaining policies allow directors wide discretion in defining “misconduct.” The authors 
conclude that only 5% of clawback policies require directors to recover excess pay, irrespective 
of whether there was a determination of misconduct. Babenko et al. (2015) examine the 
corporate proxy statements of 242 firms with restatements following the adoption of a 
clawback and find that compensation was recovered in only three instances, despite 
restatements serving as the most prominent trigger event in clawback policies. 
Currently, clawback provisions related to material accounting restatements are still 
voluntary, and prior studies have focused on examining the provisions’ economic 
consequences. A clawback provision reflects a proactive policy toward resolving agency 
problems, as opposed to a reactive policy such as firing the CEO. Boards play an important 
role in whether clawback provisions are adopted because they are essentially the “regulators” 
within a firm. However, there is substantial debate about the efficacy of clawback provisions.  
Section 304 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act enables the SEC to clawback executive 
compensation when there is a material earnings misstatement arising from misconduct. 
However, due to the SEC’s limited resources and the difficulty of proving that a restatement 
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was the result of misconduct, very few clawback cases have reached the courts (Fried and 
Shilon, 2011). Babenko et al. (2015) find little evidence that firms themselves trigger 
clawbacks to recover pay following a financial restatement or shareholder suit, even though 
restatements are the most prominent trigger events in clawback policies. One possible 
explanation Denis (2012) suggests is that while directors can, in theory, renegotiate future 
compensation or fire a manager following a financial restatement, they are reluctant to do so 
and are more likely to take the lesser step of requiring repayment of any ill-gotten gains. This 
approach is consistent with prior evidence showing that boards can be reluctant to take action 
against CEOs, even if such action is warranted (Adams, Hermalin, and Weisbach, 2010). 
  
2.2. The Effect of Board Co-option on Clawbacks 
The appointment of co-opted directors to the board is likely to be influenced by the 
CEO (and other top executives) (Coles et al., 2014). Carl Icahn, a famous activist investor, 
asserts that directors who are appointed by the CEOs whom they are supposed to be monitoring 
are essentially “cronies” (Business Week Online, November 18, 2005). Although “cronies” may 
seem like an exaggeration, at the minimum these directors are likely to be more sympathetic 
toward the CEO (Finkelstein and Hambrick, 1989). Because of concerns about board capture, 
the NYSE and NASDAQ have adopted listing requirements that substantially reduce CEOs’ 
direct influence over the process of nominating directors to the board. For example, the NYSE 
requires the committee to be composed entirely of independent directors. However, as Coles 
et al. (2014) note, CEOs are likely to influence the board nomination process despite increasing 
attempts to reduce their role. They are likely to sway the selection of the slate of directors being 
nominated, a slate that is typically voted in by shareholders (Hermalin and Weisbach, 1998; 
Cai, Garner, and Walkling, 2009). Consistent with the notion of board capture, Coles et al. 
(2014) find that greater board co-option leads to weaker board monitoring by diminishing 
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turnover-performance sensitivity, increasing pay (without a commensurate increase in pay-
performance sensitivity), and increasing empire building.  
We extend the work of Coles et al. (2014) by examining how co-option affects 
clawback implementation. An examination of clawbacks in the context of co-opted boards is a 
natural extension of Coles et al. (2014) because the implementation of clawbacks in the context 
of a co-opted board can be regarded as analogous to the proverbial “biting the hand that feeds 
you,” i.e., turning against a benefactor.8 Clawbacks, by their very nature, impose an expected 
cost of employment on the CEO (and other top executives) because of the non-zero probability 
that their compensation will be recovered by the firm.  
With clawback provisions, the financial benefit to directors in recovering excess pay 
from the executive is extremely small relative to the cost because directors typically hold a 
very small equity stake in the firm. Bebchuk and Fried (2005) argue that directors are unlikely 
to bear reputational costs for their CEO pay decisions because most such decisions can be 
justified on economic grounds ex post. In addition, developing a reputation as a director who 
blocks compensation arrangements sought by executives can only hurt the director’s chances 
of being invited to join other boards (Fried and Shilon, 2011). 
Executives, especially CEOs, have power and influence over directors that make it 
personally costly and difficult for the latter to make compensation decisions that executives 
oppose (Bebchuk and Fried, 2005; Fried and Shilon, 2011). There are numerous financial, 
social, and psychological reasons behind directors’ reluctance, especially if they are appointed 
by the CEO to make shareholder-serving compensation decisions. For example, a director who 
was put on the board by a particular executive may feel disloyal when subsequently suggesting 
that the executive’s pay should be reduced or more closely tied to performance. Director 
                                                 
8 The audit literature has examined how auditors who are more reliant on their clients, for instance regarding non-
audit fees, are less stringent with regard to allowing financial manipulation and misreporting in client audits (e.g., 
Klein, 2002; Abbott, Parker, and Peters, 2004). One might argue that this approach is similar in spirit to having 
an implicit policy of not “biting the hand that feeds you.”  
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compensation may also be adversely affected because of its close links to CEO compensation 
(Brick, Palmon, and Wald, 2006). To the extent that directors feel loyal to the executive or 
otherwise care about their relationship with him/her, they are likely to find the decision to 
recover excess pay to be personally costly. These costs are likely to exceed whatever small 
personal financial benefit is gained from recovering such excess pay. Hence, we expect that a 
more co-opted board, due to the directors’ indebtedness to the CEO, is less likely to adopt a 
clawback provision.  
However, previous studies also indicate that directors suffer from reputation penalties 
when they are implicated in financial misconduct, such as alleged financial misrepresentation 
and financial restatements (Fich and Shivdasani, 2007; Srinivasan, 2005). Similarly, Ertimur, 
Ferri, and Maber (2012) report that the directors, particularly the compensation committee 
members, of firms involved in the option backdating scandal suffered reputation penalties. 
Brochet and Srinivsan (2014) find that independent directors are held accountable when 
investors sue firms for financial and disclosure-related fraud.9 To the extent that all directors, 
including those who have been co-opted, seek to protect their reputation in the labor market, 
we would observe no association between board co-option and clawback adoption.  
The relation between board co-option and clawback adoption may also be positive. For 
example, the co-opted directors may signal to the director labor market by advocating the 
clawback adoption to demonstrate their commitment to board independence. CEOs may view 
the adoption of clawback as a cheap form of window dressing, hence supporting it to provide 
the appearance of good governance to investors while knowing that the provision will never be 
binding. Another possible reason to expect a positive association is that Dehaan et al. (2013) 
                                                 
9 However, the evidence is far from conclusive. Agarwal, Jaffe, and Karpoff (1999) find that director turnover is 
unchanged after fraud, and Fich and Shivdasani (2007) find that directors do not leave a sued firm beyond normal 
levels. Other studies also conclude that the related financial loss borne by outside directors is generally small, if 




document an increase in total CEO compensation (in particular, base salary) following 
clawback adoption.  
To summarize, the relation between board co-option and clawbacks is ultimately an 
empirical question. Hence, we state the hypothesis in null form: 
H1: Firms with co-opted boards are not associated with clawback adoption. 
 
2.3. Cross-sectional Analyses of the Effect of Board Co-option on Clawbacks 
 In this section, we present two hypotheses that explore the cross-sectional variation in 
the link between board co-option and clawbacks. These analyses have two objectives. First, we 
want to provide richer analyses of the underlying mechanism behind clawback adoption and 
the factors considered by co-opted boards in adopting clawback provisions. To achieve the 
former, we examine the impact of having a co-opted director on the compensation committee. 
For the latter, we examine an important consideration for any policy maker when implementing 
a policy—the likelihood of having to enforce it. This consideration is more pertinent for co-
opted boards because they are more likely to be beholden to the CEO, against whom they may 
have to act in the future. Second, we aim to rely on these analyses to further identify the causal 
effect of board co-option on clawbacks.10  
 
2.3.1. Having a Co-opted Director on the Compensation Committee 
Among board committees, the compensation committee has a significant influence over 
issues related to CEO compensation (Conyon and Peck, 1998). Many academics argue in favor 
of having an independent compensation committee to ensure that top executives act in the 
interests of shareholders (Williamson, 1985; Main and Johnston, 1993). Because clawbacks 
                                                 
10 To the extent that the results of these analyses are consistent with expectations regarding the factors that could 
moderate the effect of board co-option on clawback adoption, the likelihood is reduced that an (uncontrolled) 




concern CEO compensation, if a subcommittee within the board is assigned to consider and 
make recommendations about their use, this task is most likely to be delegated to the 
compensation committee. As Babenko et al. (2015) report, the primary enforcer of clawback 
provisions is the board’s compensation committee.11 
 The compensation arrangements that are determined by the compensation committee 
are influenced by many factors other than performance. For example, O’Reilly, Main, and 
Crystal (1988, p. 271) hypothesize that CEO pay might be driven by social norms “in which 
individuals base their judgments on a self-referential starting point, in this case, perhaps setting 
CEO compensation level initially based on their own level but possibly ending up with 
something higher.” Based on results showing that CEO pay is higher when the average salary 
of the compensation committee members is higher, they conclude that the evidence is 
consistent with a social comparison theory perspective. 
Williamson (1985) suggests that the absence of an independent compensation 
committee could be viewed as an executive writing his/her employment contract with one hand 
and then signing it with the other. Based on the conjecture that having a co-opted director on 
the compensation committee reduces the committee’s independence and its directors’ 
willingness to “claw the hand that feeds them,” our second hypothesis is as follows: 
H2: The association between board co-option and clawback adoption is more pronounced 
when a co-opted director is on the compensation committee. 
 
2.3.2. The Likelihood of a Clawback Provision Being Triggered in the Future 
                                                 
11 The compensation committee would propose a clawback. For example, Compensation Advisory Partner’s “A 
Practical Guide to Compensation Committee Service: Lessons from the Field,” published in 2015, pp. 153-4, 
indicates the key questions that compensation committee members should discuss when considering a clawback 
provision. This provides some evidence that compensation committees are indeed heavily involved in the decision 




Clawbacks impose a non-zero probability that the CEO’s compensation will be 
recovered in the event of financial misreporting. The decision to have a clawback provision is 
likely to involve many serious considerations, one of which is the probability that the provision 
will have to be enforced. A co-opted director is less likely to support the adoption of clawbacks 
if there is a higher likelihood that the provision will be triggered. Hence, our final hypothesis 
is as follows: 
H3: The association between board co-option and clawback adoption is more pronounced 
when there is a higher likelihood that a clawback provision will be triggered in the future. 
 
3. Sample and Empirical Results 
We obtain the director data from Riskmetrics and the Investor Responsibility Research 
Center (IRRC), clawback data from GMI Ratings12, CEO data from Execucomp, and financial 
data from the Compustat Fundamentals Annual database. The sample period is from 2007 to 
2013. The sample period begins in 2007 because GMI Ratings’ coverage of clawbacks only 
starts in that year. We exclude financial firms from the analysis because financial institutions 
that received federal bailout funds during the financial crisis in 2008 and 2009 were subject to 
mandatory clawbacks enforced by the Department of Treasury, whereas our goal is to examine 
how board co-option affects firms’ voluntary implementation of clawback provisions. Because 
clawbacks can violate home country laws for some foreign firms, we remove such firms from 
our sample (Fried and Shilon, 2011). The resulting sample consists of 6,399 firms-years. 
Because we are also interested in within-firm variation in the predictor variables to explain the 
within-firm variation in the predicted variable, firms with no variation in clawbacks over the 
sample period are dropped. In other words, this analysis focuses on firms that adopt clawback 
                                                 
12 Formed in 2010 through the merger of the Corporate Library, Governance Metrics International and Audit 
Integrity, GMI Ratings provides global research coverage of the environmental, social, governance and 
accounting-related risks that affect the performance of public companies. Prior studies using these data (e.g., 
Dehaan et al., 2013, and Chan et al., 2014) cite the Corporate Library as the data source. 
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provisions during our sample period, which thus allows us to draw causal inferences. To be 
included in our second sample set, a firm must have gone from having no clawback provision 
to adopting such a provision within our sample period. This approach results in a significant 
reduction in the sample size, from 6,399 to 2,900 firm-year observations. We report the results 
based on the above two samples separately. 
  
3.1. Keys Measures: Co-option and Clawbacks  
Following Coles et al. (2014), we use two main measures of co-option. The first is 
based on directors elected after the CEO takes office. Specifically, we measure co-option as 
follows: 
Co-option = 
𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑐𝑜−𝑜𝑝𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑑𝑖𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑠
𝐵𝑜𝑎𝑟𝑑 𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒
 
where Number of co-opted directors is the number of directors who are elected after the CEO 
takes office and Board size is the total number of directors. Co-option ranges from 0 to 1, with 
a higher value indicating greater board capture. 
The second measure of co-option focuses on co-opted directors’ tenure, with the 
underlying presumption that a director who has been on the board longer has greater influence: 
TW Co-option = 







where Co-opted Director Dummyi equals one if director i is a co-opted director and zero 
otherwise. Tenurei refers to director i’'s tenure on the board. TW Co-option ranges from 0 to 1, 
with a higher value indicating greater board capture. 
 Data on voluntary clawback provisions are obtained from GMI Ratings. Specifically, 
GMI Ratings maintains a database on the adoption of clawbacks based on firms’ annual proxy 





3.2. Relation Between Clawbacks and Co-option 
 To examine the relation between clawbacks and co-option, we rely on the following 
logistic regression specification: 
Clawbackit = β0 + β1 Board Co-optionit + β'Xit + εit.   (1) 
Board Co-option is either Co-option or TW Co-option. Clawback, Co-option, and TW 
Co-option are defined in Section 3.1. i indexes firms, and t denotes time. X represents our 
control variables. Similar to Coles et al. (2014), the focus of our analyses is on the unique 
aspect of the board being beholden to the CEO, as opposed to simply CEO power/entrenchment 
or other board characteristics. In addition to controlling for CEO power/entrenchment using 
the natural logarithm of one plus the number of years since the CEO’s appointment (CEO 
Tenure), we include two other proxies, CEO Duality and CEO Ownership, in the regression 
model. CEO Duality is an indicator variable that equals one if the CEO is also the board chair 
and zero otherwise. A CEO who is also the chair is likely to be more powerful (Hermalin and 
Weisbach, 1998). CEO Ownership is the percentage of outstanding shares held by the CEO, as 
one who owns more of the firm’s outstanding shares is likely to be more powerful. Because 
CEO turnover may potentially confound the results, we include CEO turnover, an indicator 
variable that equals one if there is a change in CEO during the year and zero otherwise. We 
also control for changes in CEO compensation, which are known to occur around clawback 
adoption (DeHaan et al., 2013). We first consider two measures related to the composition (or 
“mix”) and magnitude (or “level”) of the CEO’s annual compensation. They are (i) Total 
Comp, the natural logarithm of the value of the CEO’s total annual compensation (i.e., salary, 
bonus, restricted stock and option grants, and long-term incentive plan payouts), and (ii) % 
Equity Comp, defined as Equity Comp divided by Total Comp, where Equity Comp is the 
natural logarithm of an adjusted Black-Scholes value of the CEO’s option and fair value of 
restricted stock grants received during the year. In addition to these two measures of CEOs’ 
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annual (or “flow”) compensation, we control for two common measures of the incentives 
provided by CEOs’ equity portfolio (i.e., stock and option) holdings. The first measure of 
equity incentives is Portfolio Delta, which captures the sensitivity of a CEO’s equity portfolio 
value to changes in stock price. The second measure of equity incentives is Portfolio Vega, 
which captures the sensitivity of a CEO’s equity portfolio value to changes in the volatility of 
stock returns. We follow the literature (e.g., Core and Guay, 1999; Coles, Daniel and Naveen, 
2006) and measure Portfolio Delta as the natural logarithm of the change in the risk-neutral 
(Black-Scholes) value of the CEO’s equity portfolio given a 1% change in the firm’s stock 
price, and Portfolio Vega as the natural logarithm of the change in the risk-neutral (Black-
Scholes) value of the CEO’s equity portfolio given a 0.01 change in the risk of the company’s 
stock (measured by the standard deviation of the firm’s return).  
Next, we control for a set of board variables to ensure that we are capturing the 
incremental effect of the board being beholden to the CEO. It is possible that this dimension of 
the board is correlated with many other dimensions that have been examined in the corporate 
governance literature (e.g., Adams et al., 2010; Addy et al., 2014; Goh et al., 2016; Jia, 2016; 
Zhang and Yu, 2016). Hence, we include controls for the percentage of independent directors 
on the board (Independence); the percentage of directors who own more than 5% of the firm’s 
outstanding shares (Blockholder Directors); the percentage of directors who hold more than 
two outside board seats (Busy Board); the total number of directors on the board (Board Size); 
the number of directors on the audit committee (Audit Committee); the percentage of directors 
who attend less than 75% of board meetings (Board Meetings); an indicator variable that equals 
one if there is at least one interlocked director on the board and zero otherwise (Board 
Interlock); whether the company has dual classes of stock (Dual class); and whether the board 
is classified (Classified Board).  
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In addition to CEO and board characteristics, we control for the shareholders’ voting 
rights (Addy et al., 2014). The six voting indices are obtained from Gompers et al. (2003) and 
include limits on shareholders’ ability to amend the bylaws (Limit Amend Bylaws), the charter 
(Limit Amend Charter), cumulative voting rights (Cumulative Voting), secret balloting rights 
(Secret Ballot), super majority voting rights (Super Majority), and unequal voting rights 
(Unequal Voting).  
We control for other firm-level characteristics that influence both board co-option and 
clawbacks, such as the presence of external monitors, by including the percentage of 
outstanding shares owned by institutional investors (Institutional Ownership) and the log of 1 
plus the number of analysts following a firm (Analyst Following). We also include control 
variables that capture common firm characteristics, namely, firm size (Size), accounting 
profitability (Profit), leverage ratio (Leverage), growth opportunities (MB), and the number of 
segments (Segment), together with year, industry, or firm fixed effects in various regression 
specifications.  
The objective of including the above comprehensive set of control variables and firm 
fixed effects is to mitigate the endogeneity concerns prevalent in the corporate governance 
literature (Hermalin and Weisbach, 1998; Adams et al., 2010). Controlling for these variables 
and fixed effects is important for documenting the incremental effect of board co-option, which 
is a unique construct introduced by Coles et al. (2014) to capture the notion of the board being 
beholden to the CEO. For ease of reference, the definitions of all of the above variables are 
outlined in the appendix. All standard errors are clustered by firm.  
 
3.3. Main Results 
Table 1 provides some descriptive information on the variables used in Eq. (1). Panel 
A shows the distribution of the firms within our sample for the period between 2007 and 2013. 
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Co-option and TW Co-option are fairly stable across the years, indicating that the degree of 
board co-option remains relatively constant over our sample period. We observe an increasing 
trend of clawback adoption over the sample period, which is consistent with the trend reported 
in prior studies (e.g., Chan et al., 2012). The relatively constant degree of co-option and the 
increasing prevalence of clawbacks over time suggest that time trends are unlikely to explain 
any association between co-option and clawbacks. Nevertheless, as noted earlier, we include 
year fixed effects to examine the association between co-option and clawbacks within years. 
 Panel B presents the descriptive statistics for the variables. The mean of Clawback is 
0.405, indicating that 40.5% of the observations within our sample have a clawback provision. 
Co-option indicates that co-opted directors comprise 44.2% of the board of directors on 
average. TW Co-option indicates the total tenure of the co-opted directors relative to the total 
tenure of the entire board. The average TW Co-option of 21.0%, compared with the average 
Co-option of 44.2%, suggests that co-opted directors have fewer years of experience on the 
board than do non-co-opted directors. This result is expected because co-opted (non-co-opted) 
directors are defined as those appointed after (before) the current CEO took office. On average, 
79.7% of the board members are independent, which suggests, when compared with the 
average Co-option of 44.2%, that 35.5% of the directors are deemed independent but are in fact 
co-opted. Furthermore, the average board size in our sample is 9.42, 53.0% of the CEOs are 
also the board chair, and 22.4% of the directors hold more than two outside board seats. On 
average, 41.7% of the compensation committee has at least one co-opted director (I(Co-opt 
Com)), and 13.8% of the firms announced financial income-decreasing restatements during the 
preceding two years (Restate). Other characteristics of the boards and firms are presented in 
Panel B of Table 1. 
 Table 2 presents the Pearson correlations among the variables. As expected, there is a 
positive correlation between the two co-option measures, Co-option and TW Co-option. The 
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correlations between the key variables of interest offer some preliminary evidence of a negative 
relation between co-option and clawbacks. The correlation between Clawback and Co-option 
(TW Co-option) is -0.22 (-0.23) and is statistically significant at the 1% level.  
 Table 3 documents the regression results based on Eq. (1). Columns 1 and 2 present the 
results with firm and year fixed effects, and Columns 3 and 4 present the results with industry 
and year fixed effects. For each set of results, we use Co-option and TW Co-option as the 
measure of co-option. In Columns (1) and (2), we find consistent evidence that board co-option 
is negatively and significantly associated with the likelihood of adopting a clawback provision. 
The coefficient of Co-option is -1.616 (z-stat = -2.94) and the coefficient of TW Co-option is -
3.418 (z-stat = -3.69). To assess the economic significance of these results, we calculate the 
marginal effect of a one-standard-deviation increase in board co-option on the probability of 
clawback adoption.13Using the coefficients in Column 1 (Column 2), we estimate that a one-
standard-deviation increase in Co-option (TW Co-option) reduces the probability of adopting 
clawback by 11.95% (12.74%). These results are consistent with the interpretation that co-
opted boards are less likely to use policies that punish CEOs.  
Columns (3) and (4) examine the effect of board co-option on the use of clawbacks. 
Consistent with our prediction that co-opted boards are less likely to “claw the hand that feeds 
them,” we find that a co-opted board is negatively associated with the use of clawbacks. The 
coefficient on Co-option is -1.115 (z-stat = -6.24), and the coefficient on TW Co-option is -
2.236 (z-stat = -8.83). The economic magnitude is such that a one-standard-deviation increase 
in Co-option (TW Co-option) reduces the use of clawbacks by 8.25% (8.35%).  
 Moving on to the control variables, we find that CEO incentives (Portfolio Delta) are 
significantly related to clawbacks. There is some evidence that certain aspects of the board of 
                                                 
13
The marginal effect of a one-standard-deviation (SD) increase in the board co-option measure is computed as p 
x (1-p) x b x SD, where p is the base rate (44.2% for Co-option and 21.0% for TW Co-option), and b is the 
estimated coefficient from the logistic regression (Liao, 1994). 
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directors, specifically Busy Board and Board Meetings, are related to clawbacks. We also find 
a significant association between shareholders’ voting rights (Unequal Voting) and clawbacks. 
Finally, larger firms (Size) are associated with greater use of clawbacks, possibly because they 
are subject to greater scrutiny and are under greater pressure to institute policies to ensure that 
managers are punished for bad behavior. 
  
3.4. Cross-sectional Analyses 
3.4.1. Role of Co-opted Compensation Committee Members 
 H2 predicts that the association between board co-option and clawbacks is more 
pronounced when co-opted directors are present on the compensation committee. To test this 
hypothesis, we construct the variable I(Co-opt Comp) and extend Eq. (1) by interacting Board 
Co-option with a measure of co-option in the compensation committee: 
Clawbackit = β0 + β1 Board Co-optionit x I(Co-opt Comp)+ β2 Board Co-optionit  
+ β3 I(Co-opt Comp)it + β'Xit + εit.      (2) 
I(Co-opt Comp) is an indicator variable that equals one if at least one co-opted director sits on 
the compensation committee and zero otherwise.14  
 Table 4 presents the results based on Eq. (2). In the interest of parsimony, we report 
only the results for the variables of interest in the table. In all columns, we find that the 
coefficients on Co-option x I(Co-opt Comp) and TW Co-option x I(Co-opt Comp) are negative 
and statistically significant at the 1% level. Hence, there is statistically significant evidence in 
support of H2.15 
                                                 
14 As a robustness check, we also use the percentage of co-opted directors on the compensation committee to 
measure co-option to the committee. We find similar results using this alternative proxy. 
15 Ai and Norton (2003) question the properties of the estimators of the coefficient on the interaction term in a 
logistic model such as equation (2), as well as their related test statistics. However, Greene (2010) concludes that 
an overall statistical inference cannot be obtained from the Ai and Norton (2003) measure. Furthermore, 
Kolasinski and Seigel (2010) argue that it is appropriate to draw inferences from the interaction term in nonlinear 
models. Therefore, we use the interaction coefficient to assess the directional effect of our results. As a further 




3.4.2 The Likelihood of the Need to Enforce a Clawback Provision in the Future 
To examine how the likelihood of the need to enforce a clawback provision moderates 
the effect of board co-option on clawbacks, we extend Eq. (1) as follows: 
Clawbackit = β0 + β1 Board Co-optionit x Enforceit + β2 Board Co-optionit + β3 Enforceit  
+ β'Xit + εit,                   (3) 
where Enforce is the likelihood that a clawback provision will be triggered in the future. We 
proxy for Enforce using Restate, which is an indicator variable that equals one when the firm 
has announced a financial restatement because of an accounting failure, a regulatory 
investigation, or financial fraud at least once in the past two years, and zero otherwise. We 
obtain data on accounting restatements from Audit Analytics. Firms with a history of 
restatements are more likely to have accounting problems in the future. Files, Sharp, and 
Thompson (2014) provide evidence that repeated restatements by the same firm are likely to 
occur, especially among clients of non-Big N auditors and those with lower ex ante accounting 
quality. 
Table 5, Panel A presents the logistic regression results based on Eq. (3). In all columns, 
we find robust evidence that the coefficients on Co-option x Restate and TW Co-option x 
Restate are negative and statistically significant. The evidence indicates that the negative 
association between board co-option and clawback adoption (usage) is more pronounced for 
firms with prior restatements in Columns 1 and 2 (Columns 3 and 4), consistent with our 
prediction in H3. 
Above, we present evidence that co-opted boards are less likely to adopt clawbacks, 
especially when a co-opted director is on the compensation committee. We provide further 
                                                 
Nagarajan, and Schloetzer (2010) use, by using the “inteff” procedure in STATA. We find that the inferences 
based on this test statistic are similar to those reported in Tables 4 and 5. 
21 
 
insights by examining whether the significant interaction we observe in Panel A is driven by a 
co-opted compensation committee (Comp Co-option). We report the results in Panel B, Table 
5. As expected, the coefficients on Comp Co-option x Restate are negative and statistically 
significant at the 1% level in all columns.  
 Overall, the results presented in Table 5 provide evidence to support H3 that a co-opted 
board, especially a co-opted compensation committee, is even less likely to adopt clawback if 
there is a high likelihood that such a provision will be triggered. This evidence adds further 
credence to the notion that co-opted boards are less likely than non-co-opted boards to have 
policies that punish CEOs for accounting problems. 
 
3.5. Alternative Measures of Board Co-option 
Coles et al. (2014) highlight that CEO tenure is an important determinant of board co-
option and the exclusion of CEO tenure as a control variable could result in bias due to omitted 
correlated variables. Following Coles et al. (2014), we include CEO tenure and other CEO 
characteristics in all of our regressions. As an additional analysis, we follow Coles et al. (2014) 
in using Residual Board Co-option, which is the residual from the regression of Board Co-
option on CEO Tenure, to measure board capture. The residual is a proxy for the power related 
to the co-option of the board and is orthogonalized to the power related to CEO tenure. In Table 
6, we present the results with the two proxies of Residual Board Co-option – Residual Co-
option, and Residual TW Co-option. Consistent with the results in Table 3, we find that all 
results with Residual Co-option are similar to our earlier results with Co-option in Panel A. 
Panels B, C, and D re-produce our cross-sectional analyses using residual board co-option 
measures, and we obtain similar results. These results increase our confidence that the board’s 





3.6. Alternative Specification of the Regression Model 
In our main results, we use a logistic regression model to investigate the relation 
between clawback adoption and a co-opted board. Here, we consider an alternative approach, 
the Hazard model, in which the sample includes only the years in which the firm does not have 
clawback and the first year in which the clawback is adopted. We remove the firm-years after 
the initial clawback adoption and report the results for the reduced sample in Table 7. The 
results remain unchanged with this alternative model specification.   
 
3.7. Board Capture as a Mechanism Linking CEO Tenure to Clawbacks 
By virtue of being around longer, a CEO with a longer tenure has a greater likelihood 
of capturing the board. Board co-option, in turn, reduces the likelihood of clawback adoption. 
However, this relation is not obvious. Dikolli, Mayew and Nanda (2014) provide evidence that 
longer-tenured CEOs have less uncertainty about their abilities; thus, the board needs to 
monitor them less. Accordingly, there might be less of a need to adopt clawbacks to monitor 
CEOs who have served in their position longer due to the reduced uncertainty about their 
abilities.  
In this section, we perform a path analysis to test our prediction that CEO power 
(proxied by CEO Tenure) affects clawback provisions (Clawback) via board co-option. In a 
path analysis, a structural equation model is used to decompose the correlation between two 
variables into a direct and an indirect path through a mediating variable.16 Following studies 
that use path analyses (e.g., Shevlin, Urcan, and Vasvari, 2013; Pevzner, Xie, and Xin, 2015), 
we estimate the following model: 
                                                 
16 Specifically, a path analysis is used to answer how one variable (CEO tenure in our case) affects another (i.e., 
clawbacks). We argue that the impact occurs through a mediating variable, board co-option. In contrast, an 
interaction analysis is used to answer when a moderating variable affects the association between two variables. 
Baron and Kenny (1986) provide a discussion on mediation versus moderation. 
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Board Co-optionit = α0 + α1CEO Tenureit + εit;                (4a) 
Clawbackit = β0 +β1 Board Co-optionit + β2 CEO Tenureit + β'Xit + εit,             (4b) 
where CEO Tenure is the logarithm of 1 plus the number of years of CEO appointment at the 
firm and Xit is the set of controls used in Eq. (1).  
Panel A of Table 8 shows the path diagram. Specifically, α1 is the coefficient for the 
path from CEO power to board capture, and β1 is the coefficient for the path from board capture 
to clawbacks. The path coefficient for α1 x β1 is the magnitude of the indirect path from CEO 
power to clawback provision as mediated through board co-option.17 The significance of the 
indirect effect is estimated using the Sobel (1982) test.  
 We report the path coefficients of interest for the regressions with firm and year fixed 
effects in Panel B, and regressions with industry and year fixed effects in Panel C. In each 
panel, Columns 1 and 2 present the results with Co-option and TW Co-option as the measure 
of co-option, respectively. As the results are similar in both panels, we thus focus our 
discussion on the results with Co-option in Panel B.. The coefficient for the direct path between 
CEO tenure and a clawback provision [p(CEO Tenure, Clawback)] is positive and significant, 
suggesting that CEOs have a direct influence over clawbacks. The coefficient of the path 
between CEO tenure and board co-option [p(CEO Tenure, Co-option)] is positive and highly 
significant, indicating that powerful CEOs can influence the formation of a co-opted board. 
The coefficient of the path between board co-option and a clawback provision [p(Co-option, 
Clawback)] is negative and significant, indicating that co-opted boards are less likely to 
implement clawbacks. The total mediated path of board co-option [p(CEO Tenure, Co-option) 
x p(Co-option, Clawback)] is negative and statistically significant at the 1% level. Hence, the 
evidence suggests that board co-option is a significant channel through which CEO tenure 
                                                 
17 To carry out the path analysis, we estimate Eq. (4b) using a linear probability model. Standardized coefficients 
are reported in Panels B and C of Table 8. 
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affects clawbacks. In other words, CEOs with longer tenures can reduce the likelihood of a 
clawback by capturing the board. 
 
4. Conclusion 
 The adoption of policies to constrain potential agency problems is an important function 
of boards of directors. Although boards can adopt many tools to address agency problems ex 
ante (e.g., compensation, including various long- and short-term compensation incentives), 
these tools are typically adopted to incentivize performance, which might in turn have the 
possibly unintended consequence of encouraging financial misreporting. Clawbacks are a 
unique tool in that the typical objective is to punish CEOs for financial misreporting. This study 
examines whether co-opted boards are associated with clawback adoption. 
We focus on co-opted boards because in practice, CEOs are likely to exert considerable 
influence over the selection of board members (Coles et al., 2014). Directors often have 
financial, social, and psychological reasons for favoring executives in compensation matters; 
they are likely to feel loyal and to care about their relationship with the CEO. With the 
implementation of a clawback provision, it is personally costly for these directors to seek to 
recover excess pay from the CEO (Bebchuk and Fried, 2005; Fried and Shilon, 2011).  
We find robust evidence that board co-option is negatively associated with the 
likelihood of clawback adoption, which is consistent with the notion that co-opted directors are 
unlikely to claw back the pay of the CEO “responsible” for their appointment. Endogeneity 
might be a concern in our setting. Endogeneity can generally be classified into two categories: 
reverse causality and omitted correlated variables. To address omitted correlated variables, we 
included a wide array of control variables in our regressions, including many CEO and board 
characteristics, and industry, firm, and year fixed effects. Reverse causality is less likely to be 
a problem in our setting because it seems unlikely that clawback adoption can affect board co-
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option, which is simply the percentage of the board comprising directors appointed after the 
start of the CEO’s tenure.  
We perform a series of cross-sectional analyses to provide further evidence that board 
co-option affects clawback adoption. First, given that the board subcommittee most directly 
involved in remuneration issues is the compensation committee, we expect board co-option to 
have a stronger effect on clawback adoption if co-opted directors are on the compensation 
committee. Our evidence indicates that this is indeed the case, adding further credence to the 
notion that co-opted boards are less willing to punish the CEO for financial misreporting than 
are non-co-opted boards. Second, we examine how the likelihood of the future enforcement of 
a clawback provision influences the relation between board co-option and clawback adoption. 
We find that co-opted boards are less likely to adopt clawbacks if there is a higher likelihood 
that co-opted directors will have to enforce the clawback provision in the future. Finally, using 
a path analysis, we show that board co-option is an underlying mechanism through which CEOs 
with longer tenures can exert their power to reduce the likelihood of clawbacks. 
 Similar to the work of Coles et al. (2014), our paper offers partial analyses of some of 
the economic consequences of co-opted boards. It does not address the issue of whether board 
co-option, on average, is optimal in terms of shareholder value optimization or societal welfare. 
To the extent that co-opted boards capture friendly boards (i.e., boards friendly to the CEO), 
some papers have suggested that positive outcomes could arise from more effective 
communication between friendly boards and top management (Adams and Ferreira, 2007; 
Kang, Liu, Low, and Zhang, 2014). To the best of our knowledge, previous studies on co-opted 
boards have typically documented negative consequences. Future research might seek to 
explore the possible positive consequences of co-opted boards. 
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Appendix Variable Definitions 
Clawback Indicator variable, coded 1 if the firm has a clawback provision and 0 otherwise.  
Co-option Fraction of the board comprising directors appointed after the CEO assumed 
office. 
TW Co-option Tenure-weighted co-option, which is the sum of the tenure of co-opted directors 
divided by the sum of the tenure of all directors. 
Comp Co-option Fraction of the compensation committee comprising directors appointed after the 
CEO assumed office. 
Residual Co-option Residuals from regressing Co-option on CEO Tenure. 
Residual TW Co-option Residuals from regressing TW Co-option on CEO Tenure. 
CEO Tenure Logarithm of 1 plus the number of years of CEO appointment at the firm. 
CEO Duality Indicator variable, coded 1 if the CEO is also the chairman of the board and 0 
otherwise.  
CEO Ownership Percentage of shares owned by the CEO. 
CEO Turnover Indicator variable, coded 1 if the CEO is replaced and 0 otherwise. 
Total Comp Log of 1 plus total compensation. 
%Equity Comp Percentage of equity compensation, calculated as the value of restricted stock 
grants plus the value of option grants, all scaled by total compensation. 
Portfolio Delta Log of the dollar change in wealth associated with a 0.01 change in the standard 
deviation of the firm’s returns. Obtained from Coles, Daniel, and Naveen (2013). 
Portfolio Vega Log of the dollar change in wealth associated with a 1% change in the firm’s stock 
price. Obtained from Coles et al. (2013). 
Independence Percentage of independent directors on the board. 
Blockholder Directors Percentage of directors who own at least 5% of the common shares. 
Busy Board Percentage of directors who hold more than two outside board seats. 
Board Size Total number of directors on the board. 
Audit Committee Number of audit committee members. 
Board Meetings Percentage of directors who attend less than 75% of board meetings. 
Dual Class Indicator variable, coded 1 if the company has dual classes of stock and 0 
otherwise. 
Classified Board Indicator variable, coded 1 if the board is classified and 0 otherwise. 
Limit Amend Bylaws Indicator variable, coded 1 if the company governance attribute limits 
shareholders’ ability to amend the bylaws and 0 otherwise. 
Limit Amend Charter Indicator variable, coded 1 if the company governance attribute limits 
shareholders’ ability to amend the corporate charter and 0 otherwise. 
Cumulative Voting Indicator variable, coded 1 if the company allows cumulative voting and 0 
otherwise. 
Secret Ballot Indicator variable, coded 1 if the company uses an independent third party to count 
proxies and 0 otherwise. 
Super Majority Indicator variable, coded 1 if the charter requirement for mergers or other business 
combinations is higher than the threshold requirements for state law and 0 
otherwise. 
Unequal Voting Indicator variable, coded 1 if the company limits the voting rights of some 
shareholders and expands the voting rights of others and 0 otherwise. 
Institutional Ownership Percentage of institutional ownership. 
Analyst Following Log of 1 plus number of analysts following the firm. 
Size Natural logarithm of market capitalization.  
Leverage Long-term debt divided by beginning total assets. 
Profit EBITDA divided by beginning total assets. 
MB Market to book ratio.  
Segment Natural logarithm of the number of segments. 
I(Co-option Comp) Indicator variable, coded 1 if the number of co-opted directors on the 
compensation committee is one or more and 0 otherwise. 
Restate Indicator variable, coded 1 if the firm announces financial income-decreasing 
restatements due to accounting failures, a regulatory investigation or financial 
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Table 1 Sample 
This table presents descriptive information about the sample. There are 6,399 firm-year observations from 2007-
2013. Panel A reports the distribution of the observations over time. Panel B provides more descriptive statistics 
for the variables used in our analyses of the relation between clawbacks and board co-option. All variables are 
defined in the appendix. 
 
Panel A Distribution of observations over time 
Year Number of Firms Co-option TW Co-option Clawback 
2007 852 46.99% 18.80% 18.90% 
2008 906 45.40% 17.45% 24.94% 
2009 975 44.98% 18.53% 33.85% 
2010 898 42.96% 22.75% 39.09% 
2011 960 43.99% 24.91% 46.98% 
2012 970 43.10% 23.22% 55.46% 
2013 838 42.12% 21.14% 64.08% 
Panel B Descriptive statistics 
  Mean Median Std P25 P75 
Clawback 0.405 0.000 0.491 0.000 1.000 
Co-option 0.442 0.400 0.300 0.200 0.667 
TW Co-option 0.210 0.123 0.225 0.018 0.365 
CEO Tenure 2.606 2.773 0.466 2.398 2.944 
CEO Duality 0.530 1.000 0.499 0.000 1.000 
CEO Ownership 0.013 0.003 0.033 0.001 0.009 
CEO Turnover 0.076 0.000 0.265 0.000 0.000 
Total Comp 8.293 8.346 0.920 7.674 8.927 
% Equity Comp 0.729 0.797 0.206 0.662 0.870 
Portfolio Delta 5.338 5.335 1.418 4.401 6.273 
Portfolio Vega 3.634 4.071 2.574 2.650 5.187 
Independence 0.797 0.818 0.104 0.727 0.889 
Blockholder Directors 0.085 0.000 0.278 0.000 0.000 
Busy Board 0.224 0.200 0.176 0.100 0.333 
Board Size 9.416 9.000 2.219 8.000 11.000 
Audit Committee 3.887 4.000 1.016 3.000 4.000 
Board Meetings 0.005 0.000 0.023 0.000 0.000 
Dual Class 0.046 0.000 0.209 0.000 0.000 
Classified Board 0.477 0.000 0.499 0.000 1.000 
Limit Amend Bylaws 0.902 1.000 0.297 1.000 1.000 
Limit Amend Charter 0.926 1.000 0.262 1.000 1.000 
Cumulative Voting 0.069 0.000 0.253 0.000 0.000 
Secret Ballot 0.137 0.000 0.344 0.000 0.000 
Super Majority 0.414 0.000 0.493 0.000 1.000 
Unequal Voting 0.023 0.000 0.149 0.000 0.000 
Institutional Ownership 0.771 0.802 0.189 0.685 0.902 
Analyst Following 2.201 2.303 0.810 1.792 2.773 
Size 7.868 7.703 1.489 6.753 8.849 
Leverage 0.169 0.149 0.149 0.027 0.269 
Profit 0.132 0.125 0.086 0.079 0.178 
MB 2.756 1.996 2.653 1.311 3.186 
Segment 0.825 0.693 0.509 0.693 1.099 
I(Co-opt Com) 0.417 0.000 0.493 0.000 1.000 




Table 2 Correlations 
This table presents the Pearson correlations among the variables used in our analyses of the relation between clawbacks and board co-option. All correlations with absolute 
values greater than 0.05 are statistically significant at the 0.01 level or lower (two-tailed). All variables are defined in the appendix.  
 
    [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] [12] [13] [14] [15] [16] [17] 
[1] Claw 1.00                 
[2] Co-option -0.22 1.00                
[3] TW Co-option -0.23 0.50 1.00               
[4] CEO Tenure 0.14 0.17 0.14 1.00              
[5] CEO Duality -0.02 0.20 0.24 0.22 1.00             
[6] CEO Ownership -0.19 0.29 0.29 0.15 0.14 1.00            
[7] CEO Turnover 0.00 0.06 -0.18 0.03 -0.13 -0.04 1.00           
[8] Total Comp 0.28 -0.05 -0.10 0.23 0.15 -0.21 0.01 1.00          
[9] % Equity Comp 0.19 -0.06 -0.09 0.11 0.06 -0.19 -0.01 0.72 1.00         
[10] Portfolio Delta 0.03 0.22 0.24 0.28 0.25 0.37 -0.05 0.44 0.28 1.00        
[11] Portfolio Vega 0.11 -0.01 -0.02 0.13 0.12 -0.10 0.00 0.35 0.27 0.41 1.00       
[12] Independence 0.23 -0.05 -0.04 0.12 0.16 -0.27 -0.02 0.27 0.26 -0.02 0.15 1.00      
[13] Blockholder Directors -0.05 -0.04 -0.03 -0.05 -0.11 0.04 0.05 -0.11 -0.10 -0.06 -0.08 -0.10 1.00     
[14] Busy Board 0.19 -0.08 -0.15 0.11 0.12 -0.16 0.04 0.40 0.30 0.20 0.18 0.30 -0.06 1.00    
[15] Board Size 0.30 -0.17 -0.20 0.18 0.08 -0.20 0.05 0.34 0.15 0.13 0.18 0.20 0.02 0.22 1.00   
[16] Audit Committee 0.21 -0.14 -0.13 0.16 0.09 -0.15 0.01 0.21 0.10 0.03 0.08 0.26 -0.04 0.20 0.48 1.00  
[17] Board Meetings -0.03 0.01 0.02 -0.04 -0.01 0.01 -0.01 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 -0.03 0.03 0.01 0.05 0.01 1.00 
[18] Dual Class -0.05 0.05 0.01 0.02 -0.03 0.13 -0.01 0.02 -0.03 0.09 0.01 -0.21 0.03 -0.05 0.01 -0.06 0.05 
[19] Classified Board -0.11 0.03 0.03 -0.10 0.05 0.08 -0.01 -0.15 -0.08 -0.05 -0.03 -0.07 -0.01 -0.10 -0.07 -0.03 0.04 
[20] Limit Amend Bylaws 0.04 -0.01 0.00 0.04 0.01 -0.05 -0.01 0.07 0.10 0.02 0.07 0.04 -0.02 0.04 0.01 0.00 0.02 
[21] Limit Amend Charter 0.06 -0.05 0.01 0.10 -0.02 -0.08 -0.02 0.05 0.04 0.04 0.06 0.06 0.02 0.04 0.08 0.06 0.02 
[22] Cumulative Voting -0.04 -0.03 -0.03 0.03 -0.02 -0.02 0.00 -0.10 -0.07 -0.06 -0.03 -0.02 0.03 -0.04 -0.03 0.04 0.00 
[23] Secret ballot 0.14 -0.07 -0.10 0.11 0.09 -0.09 0.02 0.21 0.12 0.12 0.11 0.15 -0.07 0.17 0.21 0.14 0.00 
[24] Super Majority 0.29 -0.10 -0.13 0.18 0.03 -0.15 0.01 0.37 0.25 0.18 0.16 0.23 -0.09 0.23 0.24 0.18 -0.05 
[25] Unequal Voting 0.00 0.03 0.01 0.04 -0.05 0.08 0.00 0.04 0.01 0.09 0.00 -0.11 0.03 -0.03 0.02 -0.02 0.05 
[26] Institutional Ownership -0.11 0.07 0.05 -0.10 -0.04 -0.09 0.00 0.01 0.09 0.02 0.06 0.05 -0.09 0.02 -0.24 -0.12 0.00 
[27] Analyst Following 0.15 -0.01 0.00 0.14 0.08 -0.12 0.02 0.36 0.25 0.28 0.19 0.13 -0.11 0.20 0.20 0.12 0.00 
[28] Size 0.34 -0.12 -0.14 0.28 0.15 -0.21 0.02 0.70 0.44 0.56 0.35 0.23 -0.11 0.41 0.51 0.30 0.01 
[29] Leverage 0.09 -0.02 -0.06 0.09 0.05 -0.09 0.02 0.21 0.16 0.05 0.06 0.12 -0.02 0.15 0.14 0.12 -0.01 
[30] Profit -0.03 -0.01 0.01 -0.06 0.00 0.03 -0.01 0.11 0.12 0.23 0.06 -0.03 0.01 0.05 -0.15 -0.07 -0.01 
[31] MB 0.03 0.00 0.00 -0.03 -0.02 -0.01 -0.01 0.13 0.14 0.25 0.09 0.03 0.00 0.08 -0.04 -0.03 0.00 
[32] Segment 0.03 -0.02 -0.04 0.11 0.06 -0.03 0.02 0.07 0.07 0.00 -0.02 0.04 -0.03 0.12 -0.06 0.05 0.02 
[33] I(Co-opt Comp) -0.19 0.40 0.78 0.11 0.13 0.25 -0.16 -0.12 -0.11 0.18 -0.03 -0.11 -0.01 -0.18 -0.20 -0.12 0.01 





Table 2 (continued) 
    [18] [19] [20] [21] [22] [23] [24] [25] [26] [27] [28] [29] [30] [31] [32] [33] 
[18] Dual Class 1.00                
[19] Classified Board -0.03 1.00               
[20] Limit Amend Bylaws -0.01 0.02 1.00              
[21] Limit Amend Charter -0.01 0.09 0.13 1.00             
[22] Cumulative Voting -0.03 -0.05 -0.03 0.00 1.00            
[23] Secret Ballot -0.06 -0.09 0.07 0.03 0.02 1.00           
[24] Super Majority -0.12 -0.15 0.04 0.08 -0.13 0.18 1.00          
[25] Unequal Voting 0.58 -0.07 -0.01 0.02 -0.02 -0.03 -0.06 1.00         
[26] Institutional Ownership 0.03 0.04 0.13 0.10 -0.04 -0.09 -0.02 -0.01 1.00        
[27] Analyst Following -0.06 -0.10 0.06 0.01 -0.01 0.10 0.25 -0.02 0.06 1.00       
[28] Size 0.02 -0.21 0.05 0.07 -0.05 0.30 0.44 0.05 -0.12 0.50 1.00      
[29] Leverage 0.00 -0.05 -0.04 0.01 -0.05 0.10 0.14 0.02 0.00 -0.01 0.15 1.00     
[30] Profit 0.02 -0.01 -0.04 -0.08 -0.02 0.00 0.04 0.03 0.12 0.14 0.18 0.00 1.00    
[31] MB 0.03 0.00 0.01 -0.02 -0.04 0.05 0.05 0.06 0.05 0.14 0.23 0.08 0.44 1.00   
[32] Segment -0.01 0.02 0.00 -0.01 -0.01 0.08 0.03 -0.01 -0.02 -0.06 0.05 0.11 0.08 0.00 1.00  
[33] I(Co-opt Comp) 0.03 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.11 -0.13 0.02 0.04 -0.01 -0.15 -0.06 0.02 0.00 -0.05 1.00 
[34] Restate 0.03 0.01 0.04 0.01 0.02 -0.04 -0.03 0.02 0.05 -0.04 -0.09 0.00 -0.08 -0.05 0.02 0.00 
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Table 3 Relation between clawbacks and board co-option 
This table presents the results of the regressions examining the relation between clawbacks and board co-option. 
The dependent variable is Clawback. We define all variables in the appendix. z-statistics are presented beneath 
the coefficients within parentheses. Constants are included but not reported. *, **, and *** denote significance at 
the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. Standard errors are corrected for heteroscedasticity and are clustered 
at the firm level. 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Measure of Board Co-option Co-option TW Co-option Co-option TW Co-option 
         
Board Co-option -1.616 -3.418 -1.115 -2.236 
 (-2.94)*** (-3.69)*** (-6.24)*** (-8.83)*** 
CEO Tenure -0.325 -0.647 0.116 0.150 
 (-0.41) (-0.82) (0.85) (1.13) 
CEO Duality -0.262 0.017 -0.094 0.000 
 (-0.97) (0.05) (-0.82) (0.00) 
CEO Ownership 16.795 15.749 -1.336 -1.850 
 (1.71)* (1.74)* (-0.43) (-0.62) 
CEO Turnover 0.273 -0.121 0.037 -0.285 
 (1.12) (-0.48) (0.33) (-2.54)** 
Total Comp 0.105 0.138 0.217 0.187 
 (0.40) (0.53) (2.30)** (1.97)** 
% Equity Comp -0.680 -1.151 -0.128 -0.162 
 (-0.68) (-1.19) (-0.38) (-0.49) 
Portfolio Delta -0.611 -0.501 -0.260 -0.196 
 (-2.96)*** (-2.15)** (-3.85)*** (-2.95)*** 
Portfolio Vega 0.143 0.137 0.050 0.047 
 (1.54) (1.45) (1.66)* (1.58) 
Independence -2.225 -1.573 2.232 2.374 
 (-1.16) (-0.80) (3.71)*** (3.95)*** 
Blockholder Directors -0.027 0.026 -0.177 -0.185 
 (-0.06) (0.05) (-1.06) (-1.09) 
Busy Board 2.050 2.037 0.896 0.776 
 (2.04)** (1.98)** (2.67)*** (2.31)** 
Board Size 0.145 0.140 0.117 0.111 
 (1.42) (1.35) (3.70)*** (3.45)*** 
Audit Committee 0.105 0.091 0.034 0.045 
 (0.78) (0.66) (0.61) (0.81) 
Board Meetings -3.959 -3.947 -2.615 -2.596 
 (-1.77)* (-1.70)* (-1.77)* (-1.70)* 
Dual Class -0.364 -0.633 -0.040 -0.098 
 (-0.55) (-1.10) (-0.12) (-0.29) 
Classified Board 0.228 0.244 -0.063 -0.084 
 (0.54) (0.55) (-0.59) (-0.78) 
Limit Amend Bylaws 0.568 0.539 -0.061 -0.049 
 (1.10) (0.99) (-0.33) (-0.26) 
Limit Amend Charter 0.039 0.067 -0.172 -0.133 
 (0.06) (0.11) (-0.83) (-0.62) 
Cumulative Voting -0.535 -0.603 -0.181 -0.243 
 (-0.76) (-0.76) (-0.76) (-1.02) 
Secret ballot 1.567 1.327 0.182 0.155 
 (1.22) (1.28) (1.13) (0.98) 
Super Majority -0.077 -0.071 0.347 0.297 
 (-0.22) (-0.20) (3.02)*** (2.58)*** 
Unequal Voting -1.272 -1.504 -0.503 -0.615 
 (-1.77)* (-1.91)* (-2.11)** (-2.56)** 
Institutional Ownership -0.724 -0.791 -0.298 -0.325 
 (-0.72) (-0.79) (-1.00) (-1.07) 
Analyst Following -0.455 -0.401 -0.074 -0.056 
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 (-1.35) (-1.23) (-0.97) (-0.73) 
Size 0.706 0.666 0.353 0.315 
 (1.92)* (1.71)* (4.77)*** (4.29)*** 
Leverage -1.656 -1.829 0.308 0.254 
 (-1.22) (-1.35) (0.81) (0.65) 
Profit -5.451 -5.635 -0.277 -0.167 
 (-2.52)** (-2.57)** (-0.42) (-0.25) 
MB 0.028 0.040 0.001 0.001 
 (0.96) (1.42) (0.04) (0.03) 
Segment 0.028 -0.004 0.212 0.203 
 (0.04) (-0.01) (1.72)* (1.62)      
     
Observations 2,900 2,900 6,316 6,316 
R-square 0.567 0.573 0.252 0.260 
Industry FE No No Yes Yes 
Firm FE Yes Yes No No 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
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Table 4 The effect of having co-opted directors on the compensation committee 
This table presents the results of the regressions examining the effect of having co-opted directors on the 
compensation committee on the relation between clawbacks and board co-option. The dependent variable is 
Clawback. We define all variables in the appendix. z-statistics are presented beneath the coefficients within 
parentheses. We include the same set of control variables as in Table 3. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 
10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. Standard errors are corrected for heteroscedasticity and are clustered at the 
firm level. 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Measure of Board Co-option Co-option TW Co-option Co-option TW Co-option 
         
Board Co-option*I(Co-opt Comp) -2.284 -5.462 -2.316 -5.407 
 (-3.80)*** (-3.64)*** (-7.80)*** (-10.16)*** 
Board Co-option -0.954 -0.638 -0.250 0.938 
 (-1.75)* (-0.57) (-1.27) (1.86)* 
I(Co-opt Comp) 0.288 0.790 0.634 1.060 
 (0.87) (1.64) (3.75)*** (6.15)***      
     
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 2,900 2,900 6,316 6,316 
R-square 0.579 0.584 0.267 0.279 
Industry FE No No Yes Yes 
Firm FE Yes Yes No No 





Table 5 The likelihood of the need to enforce a clawback provision in the future 
This table presents the results of the regressions examining the need to enforce a clawback provision moderating 
the effect of board co-option on clawbacks. The dependent variable is Clawback. Enforcement likelihood is 
measured by Restate. We define all variables in the appendix. z-statistics are presented beneath the coefficients 
within parentheses. We include the same set of control variables as in Table 3. *, **, and *** denote significance 
at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. Standard errors are corrected for heteroscedasticity and are clustered 
at the firm level. 
 
Panel A: The relation between board co-option and restatement on clawbacks 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Measure of Board Co-option Co-option TW Co-option Co-option TW Co-option 
         
Board Co-option*Restate -2.653 -3.930 -1.541 -2.291 
 (-2.86)*** (-2.03)** (-3.72)*** (-4.04)*** 
Board Co-option -1.305 -3.213 -0.950 -2.025 
 (-2.30)** (-3.27)*** (-5.02)*** (-7.55)*** 
Restate 0.758 0.260 0.147 -0.104 
 (1.60) (0.70) (0.65) (-0.60)      
     
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 2,900 2,900 6,316 6,316 
R-square 0.571 0.576 0.256 0.265 
Industry FE No No Yes Yes 
Firm FE Yes Yes No No 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Panel B: The relation between co-opted compensation and restatement on clawbacks 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Measure of CompCo-option Co-option TW Co-option Co-option TW Co-option 
         
Comp Co-option*Restate -2.395 -4.898 -1.243 -1.838 
 (-2.67)*** (-3.59)*** (-3.84)*** (-4.27)*** 
Comp Co-option -1.249 -1.376 -0.804 -1.006 
 (-2.91)*** (-2.77)*** (-5.17)*** (-5.98)*** 
Restate 0.289 0.402 -0.067 -0.076 
 (0.82) (1.13) (-0.38) (-0.46)      
     
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 2,900 2,900 6,316 6,316 
R-square 0.574 0.576 0.256 0.262 
Industry FE No No Yes Yes 
Firm FE Yes Yes No No 






Table 6: Robustness check: Alternative measures of board co-option 
This table provides results for an alternative measure of board co-option, the residual from a regression of board 
co-option on CEO tenure. The residual is a proxy for the power related to the co-option of the board and is 
orthogonal to the power related to CEO tenure. In Panels A to D, we present the results with the two proxies of 
Residual Board Co-option - Residual Co-option and Residual TW Co-option, with industry and year fixed effects 
as well as with firm and year fixed effects. We define all variables in the appendix. z-statistics are presented 
beneath the coefficients within parentheses. We include the same set of control variables as in Table 3. *, **, and 
*** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. Standard errors are corrected for 
heteroscedasticity and are clustered at the firm level. 
 
Panel A: Board co-option and clawback adoption 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Measure of Board Co-option 
Residual  Residual  Residual  Residual 
Co-option TW Co-option Co-option TW Co-option      
Board Co-option -1.616 -3.418 -1.113 -2.238 
 (-2.94)*** (-3.69)*** (-6.21)*** (-8.83)***     
     
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 2,900 2,900 6,399 6,399 
R-square 0.573 0.567 0.252 0.26 
Industry FE No No Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm FE Yes Yes No No 
Panel B: Co-opted directors on the compensation committee and clawback adoption 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Measure of Board Co-option 
Residual  Residual  Residual  Residual 
Co-option TW Co-option Co-option TW Co-option      
Board Co-option*I(Co-opt Comp) -1.311 -3.258 -1.593 -3.977 
 (-1.69)* (-1.72)* (-4.76)*** (-5.62)*** 
I(Co-opt Comp) -0.704 -0.353 -0.387 -0.052 
 (-2.91)*** (-1.05) (-3.55)*** (-0.33)     
Board Co-option -1.085 -1.21 -0.401 0.208 
 (-1.88)* (-0.91) (-1.90)* -0.34 
     
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 2,900 2,900 6,399 6,399 
R-square 0.573 0.567 0.252 0.26 
Industry FE No No Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 




Panel C: The relation between board co-option and restatement on clawbacks 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Measure of Board Co-option 
Residual  Residual  Residual  Residual 
Co-option TW Co-option Co-option TW Co-option      
Board Co-option*Restate -2.692 -4.167 -1.658 -2.159 
 (-2.66)*** (-1.91)* (-3.89)*** (-3.55)*** 
Board Co-option -1.294 -3.213 -0.936 -2.032 
 (-2.30)** (-3.29)*** (-4.93)*** (-7.55)*** 
Restate -0.421 -0.565 -0.54 -0.576 
 (-1.44) (-1.49) (-3.83)*** (-4.11)***     
     
     
     
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 2,900 2,900 6,399 6,399 
R-square 0.571 0.576 0.256 0.265 
Industry FE No No Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm FE Yes Yes No No 
Panel D: The relation between co-opted compensation committee and restatement on clawbacks 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Measure of Board Co-option 
Residual Comp Residual Comp Residual Comp Residual Comp 
Co-option TW Co-option Co-option TW Co-option      
Comp Co-option*Restate -1.593 -3.100 -0.965 -1.413 
 (-1.65)* (-2.31)** (-2.92)*** (-3.66)*** 
Comp Co-option -1.305 -1.397 -0.828 -1.03 
 (-3.05)*** (-2.85)*** (-5.28)*** (-6.08)*** 
Restate -0.43 -0.67 -0.515 -0.565 
 (-1.30) (-1.78)* (-3.73)*** (-3.98)*** 
     
          
     
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 2,900 2,900 6,399 6,399 
R-square 0.572 0.572 0.255 0.26 
Industry FE No No Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 




Table 7 Alternative model specification 
This table provides results for an alternative model specification in which we retain all firm-year with no adoption 
and only the first year of adoption in the sample. We define all variables in the appendix. z-statistics are presented 
beneath the coefficients within parentheses. We include the same set of control variables as in Table 3. *, **, and 
*** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. Standard errors are corrected for 
heteroscedasticity and are clustered at the firm level. 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Measure of Board Co-option Co-option TW Co-option Co-option TW Co-option 
         
Board Co-option -1.400 -3.745 -0.845 -1.932 
 (-2.40)** (-4.31)*** (-5.04)*** (-8.18)*** 
CEO Tenure -0.636 -0.802 -0.195 -0.164 
 (-0.72) (-0.91) (-1.85)* (-1.61) 
CEO Duality -0.314 -0.011 -0.103 -0.032 
 (-1.10) (-0.03) (-1.04) (-0.32) 
CEO Ownership 10.272 10.500 0.827 0.749 
 (1.13) (1.33) (0.34) (0.33) 
CEO Turnover 0.103 -0.382 0.048 -0.215 
 (0.38) (-1.21) (0.31) (-1.39) 
Total Comp 0.017 0.038 0.240 0.215 
 (0.06) (0.13) (2.59)*** (2.33)** 
% Equity Comp -0.800 -1.132 -0.265 -0.261 
 (-0.72) (-1.04) (-0.80) (-0.79) 
Portfolio Delta -0.377 -0.254 -0.254 -0.198 
 (-1.88)* (-1.15) (-4.19)*** (-3.30)*** 
Portfolio Vega 0.108 0.117 0.069 0.060 
 (1.23) (1.23) (2.33)** (2.06)** 
Independence -0.999 -0.238 1.460 1.606 
 (-0.54) (-0.13) (2.93)*** (3.21)*** 
Blockholder Directors 0.141 0.146 -0.031 -0.035 
 (0.27) (0.25) (-0.21) (-0.24) 
Busy Board 2.336 2.311 0.805 0.666 
 (2.21)** (2.19)** (2.81)*** (2.31)** 
Board Size 0.145 0.132 0.088 0.081 
 (1.55) (1.37) (3.27)*** (2.94)*** 
Audit Committee 0.058 0.100 -0.021 -0.016 
 (0.37) (0.63) (-0.41) (-0.29) 
Board Meetings -3.642 -3.603 -2.301 -2.232 
 (-1.42) (-1.36) (-1.17) (-1.12) 
Dual Class -10.503 -10.583 -0.070 -0.137 
 (-14.81)*** (-15.41)*** (-0.29) (-0.55) 
Classified Board 0.458 0.477 0.006 -0.009 
 (0.92) (0.92) (0.07) (-0.09) 
Limit Amend Bylaws 0.561 0.545 0.011 0.025 
 (0.91) (0.85) (0.07) (0.16) 
Limit Amend Charter 0.304 0.377 -0.024 0.005 
 (0.57) (0.69) (-0.14) (0.03) 
Cumulative Voting 0.122 -0.026 -0.064 -0.107 




Table 7 (continued) 
 
Secret ballot 1.483 1.336 0.199 0.170 
 (1.11) (1.18) (1.53) (1.31) 
Super Majority -0.005 -0.035 0.236 0.189 
 (-0.01) (-0.09) (2.38)** (1.91)* 
Unequal Voting -1.856 -2.368 -0.412 -0.535 
 (-2.31)** (-2.70)*** (-1.00) (-1.28) 
Institutional Ownership -0.789 -1.113 -0.276 -0.314 
 (-0.77) (-1.04) (-1.08) (-1.24) 
Analyst Following -0.482 -0.405 -0.118 -0.101 
 (-1.31) (-1.11) (-1.86)* (-1.61) 
Size 0.515 0.446 0.274 0.243 
 (1.34) (1.11) (4.24)*** (3.79)*** 
Leverage -0.822 -0.980 0.321 0.264 
 (-0.60) (-0.70) (0.99) (0.80) 
Profit -4.636 -4.514 -0.741 -0.695 
 (-2.21)** (-2.12)** (-1.24) (-1.15) 
MB 0.042 0.071 0.012 0.014 
 (1.17) (1.96)* (0.76) (0.84) 
Segment 0.119 0.145 0.140 0.122 
 (0.16) (0.18) (1.44) (1.25) 
     
Observations 1,888 1,888 4,489 4,489 
R-square 0.361 0.378 0.107 0.116 
Industry FE No No Yes Yes 
Firm FE Yes Yes No No 





Table 8 Co-opted board as an underlying mechanism linking CEO tenure and clawbacks 
Panel A provides a path diagram that depicts the prediction of how CEO power can affect clawbacks indirectly via board capture. The path coefficient α1 is the magnitude of 
the path coefficient from CEO tenure to a co-opted board. The path coefficient β1 is the magnitude of the path from board co-option to clawbacks. The path coefficient α1*β1 
measures the magnitude of the indirect path from CEO tenure to clawbacks mediated through a co-opted board. The predicted signs of the path coefficients are included in 
parentheses. 
 
Panels B (Panel C) reports the results from a path analysis for regressions with firm and year fixed effects (industry and year fixed effects), respectively. The path analysis 
examines the effect of CEO tenure on clawbacks through a co-opted board. p(X1,X2) stands for the standardized path coefficient. The t-statistics of the coefficients are reported 
in parentheses.  
We estimate the following model: 
Board Co-optionit = α0 + α1CEO tenureit + εit;    
Clawbackit = β0 +β1 Board Co-optionit + β2 CEO tenureit + β'Xit + εit,   
where CEO Tenure is the logarithm of one plus the number of years the CEO has worked at the firm and Xit is the same set of controls as in our main regression.  
The path coefficient β2 is the magnitude of the direct path from CEO tenure to clawbacks. The path coefficient α1*β1 is the magnitude of the indirect path from CEO tenure to 
clawbacks mediated through a co-opted board. The significance of the indirect effect is estimated using the Sobel (1982) test. The table reports the path coefficients of interest. 
We define all variables in the appendix. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels (two-tailed), respectively. Standard errors are corrected for 
heteroscedasticity and are clustered at the firm level. 
 


















Panel B Path Analysis (with firm and year fixed effects) 
  Co-option TW Co-option 
Direct path   
P(CEO Tenure, Clawback)=β2 0.076 0.078 
 (2.86)*** (3.08)*** 
Mediated path of board co-option   
P(CEO Tenure, Co-option)=α1 0.095 0.054 
 (3.49)*** (3.82)*** 
P(Co-option, Clawback) =β1 -0.157 -0.297 
 (-4.24)*** (-5.35)***    
Total mediated path of board co-option=(α1*β1) -0.015 -0.016 
 (-4.03)*** (-1.75)*   
Controls Yes Yes 
Observations 2,900 2,900 
Panel C Path Analysis (with industry and year fixed effects) 
  Co-option TW Co-option 
Direct path   
P(CEO Tenure, Clawback)=β2 0.027 0.028 
 (1.22) (1.30) 
Mediated path of board co-option   
P(CEO Tenure, Co-option)=α1 0.131 0.068 
 (7.90)*** (6.82)*** 
P(Co-option, Clawback) =β1 -0.192 -0.354 
 (-6.30)*** (-9.10)***   
Total mediated path of board co-option=(α1*β1) -0.025 -0.024 
 (-4.03)*** (-1.75)*   
Controls Yes Yes 
Observations 6,399 6,399 
 
